Fred Dretske has formulated a representational (or indirect realist) account of perception that includes the following two features:
(1) Representational Vehicles/Contents
Dretske first distinguishes between representational vehicle and representational contents as follows: "There are representational vehicles—the objects, events, or conditions that represent—and representational contents—the conditions or situations the vehicle represents as being so" (Dretske 68).
(2) Qualia
Secondly, Dretske appeals to qualia: "qualia are properties that physical objects, the ones we experience, normally have. They are not properties that experiences have" (Dretske 69).
In contrast to Dretske, Michael Huemer formulates and defends a version of direct realism in his book Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Huemer gives the following rough characterization of direct realism: “Direct realism holds that in perception, we are directly aware of external phenomena” (Huemer x). In order to achieve a deeper understanding of Huemer's direct realism, we need to understand his conception of awareness. For Huemer, "awareness is always awareness of something. Logically, awareness is a relation between a being who is aware (the ‘subject of awareness’) and that of which he is aware (the ‘object of awareness’)" (Huemer 51).
More precisely, Huemer defines awareness as follows (Huemer 55):
S is aware of x if and only if:
i. S has an assertive mental representation (an apprehension),
ii. x exists and at least roughly satisfies the content of that representation, and
iii. it is not accidental (not due to chance) that the content of the representation is satisfied.
According to Huemer, awareness comes in two forms: indirect and direct. He explains this distinction as follows:
In general, you are indirectly aware of x if you are aware of x, but your awareness of x is based on your awareness of something else. You are directly aware of x if you are aware of x, and your awareness of x is not based on your awareness of anything else. (Huemer 55)
So representationalists like Dretske ostensibly "believe that those mental states [that exist purely in our minds and that ‘represent’ external objects] are the only things that we can be directly aware of. It is [this] thesis that defines indirect realism" (Huemer 79). In contrast, "A ‘version of direct realism’ would be any theory of perception which implies that in perception, we are directly aware of something external to the mind" (Huemer 79).
Direct and indirect realism are thus mutually exclusive. We might conclude, then, that Dretske and Huemer are fundamentally at odds. Intriguingly, however, Huemer, like Dretske, also distinguishes between vehicles and contents: "The fundamental mistake that seems to make indirect realism plausible . . . is a confusion between an object of awareness and a vehicle of awareness. An object of awareness is that of which one is aware. A vehicle of awareness is that by which one is aware of it" (Huemer 81).
Given that both Dretske and Huemer make a vehicle/content distinction, might there be common ground in Dretske's and Huemer's accounts? Our answer will depend on which sorts of things are supposed to count as representational vehicles on Dretske's account. Dretske himself isn't particularly clear on this issue, though he leaves room for the possibility that brain states are a kind of representational vehicle. Huemer would likely agree on that count. We might wonder, though, what would prevent a representational perceptual experience itself from being a vehicle of awareness in Huemer's sense. If Dretske insists that it is the representational perceptual experience itself that one is aware of, then Dretske's account ultimately diverges from Huemer's. On the other hand, if Dretske's account is flexible enough to allow that a representational perceptual experience as a whole might be that by which one is aware of things in the world, then Dretske and Huemer might ultimately agree on perception.
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| Fred Dretske |
Dretske first distinguishes between representational vehicle and representational contents as follows: "There are representational vehicles—the objects, events, or conditions that represent—and representational contents—the conditions or situations the vehicle represents as being so" (Dretske 68).
(2) Qualia
Secondly, Dretske appeals to qualia: "qualia are properties that physical objects, the ones we experience, normally have. They are not properties that experiences have" (Dretske 69).
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| Michael Huemer |
More precisely, Huemer defines awareness as follows (Huemer 55):
S is aware of x if and only if:
i. S has an assertive mental representation (an apprehension),
ii. x exists and at least roughly satisfies the content of that representation, and
iii. it is not accidental (not due to chance) that the content of the representation is satisfied.
According to Huemer, awareness comes in two forms: indirect and direct. He explains this distinction as follows:In general, you are indirectly aware of x if you are aware of x, but your awareness of x is based on your awareness of something else. You are directly aware of x if you are aware of x, and your awareness of x is not based on your awareness of anything else. (Huemer 55)
So representationalists like Dretske ostensibly "believe that those mental states [that exist purely in our minds and that ‘represent’ external objects] are the only things that we can be directly aware of. It is [this] thesis that defines indirect realism" (Huemer 79). In contrast, "A ‘version of direct realism’ would be any theory of perception which implies that in perception, we are directly aware of something external to the mind" (Huemer 79).
Direct and indirect realism are thus mutually exclusive. We might conclude, then, that Dretske and Huemer are fundamentally at odds. Intriguingly, however, Huemer, like Dretske, also distinguishes between vehicles and contents: "The fundamental mistake that seems to make indirect realism plausible . . . is a confusion between an object of awareness and a vehicle of awareness. An object of awareness is that of which one is aware. A vehicle of awareness is that by which one is aware of it" (Huemer 81).
Given that both Dretske and Huemer make a vehicle/content distinction, might there be common ground in Dretske's and Huemer's accounts? Our answer will depend on which sorts of things are supposed to count as representational vehicles on Dretske's account. Dretske himself isn't particularly clear on this issue, though he leaves room for the possibility that brain states are a kind of representational vehicle. Huemer would likely agree on that count. We might wonder, though, what would prevent a representational perceptual experience itself from being a vehicle of awareness in Huemer's sense. If Dretske insists that it is the representational perceptual experience itself that one is aware of, then Dretske's account ultimately diverges from Huemer's. On the other hand, if Dretske's account is flexible enough to allow that a representational perceptual experience as a whole might be that by which one is aware of things in the world, then Dretske and Huemer might ultimately agree on perception.
References
Dretske, F. 2003: Experience As Representation. Philosophical Issues, Vol. 13, 67-82.
Huemer, M. 2001: Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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